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REFLECTIONS ON A REVOLUTION: HOW 
CHIEF JUSTICE GANTS MADE 
MASSACHUSETTS A LEADER IN 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION LAW 
RADHA NATARAJAN* 
ERIK DOUGHTY** 
Abstract: Radha Natarajan and Erik Doughty reflect on the revolutionary contri-
butions Chief Justice Ralph D. Gants made to eyewitness identification law in 
Massachusetts. From convening the Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence to au-
thoring several seminal eyewitness identification cases, Chief Justice Gants’s 
contributions represented a seismic shift in how eyewitness evidence would be 
treated in Massachusetts. That sea change, which included rewriting jury instruc-
tions, restricting in-court identifications, and reexamining how to assess eyewit-
ness reliability, developed from a rigorous fidelity to scientific development. This 
foray into the scientific study behind eyewitness identifications has created a 
template for tackling other complex issues in the criminal legal system including 
racial disparities, implicit bias, and credibility determinations, and provides a 
model for other jurisdictions to follow. 
I. ACCOMPLICES IN CHIEF JUSTICE GANTS’S PURSUIT OF  
LASTING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION REFORM 
A. A Common Goal 
(by Radha Natarajan) 
By the time Chief Justice Gants,1 alongside a unanimous Court, decided 
to convene a Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence to consider the science and 
law of eyewitness identification in Massachusetts, I had been immersed in 
these issues for the better part of a decade.2 Like others, Chief Justice Gants 
and I had both been led to the same place through the recognition that eyewit-
                                                                                                                           
 © 2021, Radha Natarajan & Erik Doughty. All rights reserved. 
 * Executive Director, New England Innocence Project; Member, Study Group on Eyewitness 
Evidence and Standing Committee on Eyewitness Identification. 
 ** Law Clerk to Chief Justice Gants from 2014–2015; Legal Counsel at Santander Bank, N.A. 
 1 We use the title of Chief Justice throughout this article even though Chief Justice Gants au-
thored some of the decisions cited when he was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. 
He was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court on January 29, 2009, and he was elevated to Chief 
Justice on July 28, 2014. 
 2 Commonwealth v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 208 n.16 (Mass. 2011). 
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ness misidentification was one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions. 
Indeed, there was not a systemic issue in the criminal legal system that Chief 
Justice Gants could ignore. Because of that, my own path—as a Roxbury De-
fender3 and wrongful convictions advocate—and his—as a leader and radical 
thinker about justice—crossed at multiple junctures. 
There were a number of important criminal law issues—racial disparities 
throughout the system, rules changes on plea bargaining that exacerbated pow-
er imbalances, and building toward an end to mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing—that brought us together into the same spaces. Nonetheless, there was no 
effort that we undertook together that was as sustained as the one he led to 
bring eyewitness identification law in line with scientific research. Although it 
makes sense that such a huge shift—tethering the law to science rather than 
“common sense”—required a longstanding (even permanent) commitment, it 
also could be considered at odds with Chief Justice Gants’s characteristic (and 
admirable) sense of urgency about all things related to justice. 
My formal entrance to this issue was in 2003 with the research and writ-
ing of a law school Note on cross-racial identifications.4 Immediately thereaf-
ter, as a public defender in Massachusetts, I chafed at the state of the law on 
eyewitness identification and worked on amplifying within the bar what I had 
learned about the science. Chief Justice Gants’s formal appearance in this area 
might be traced back to his decision in Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago.5 He 
had previously adjudicated (with less attention), however, eyewitness identifi-
cation cases as a Superior Court judge. 
For Chief Justice Gants, like for me, the challenge of addressing eyewit-
ness misidentifications was not simply a matter of intellectual integrity. It was 
deeply personal. We had both seen the harms suffered by those wrongfully 
convicted by eyewitness misidentification.6 Those experiences shaped and 
stayed with us. In addition, because of our selective attention to this issue, we 
began to notice and memorialize where eyewitness misidentifications occurred 
in our own lives—outside the courtroom and its catastrophic consequences. 
The appreciation that eyewitness misidentifications were ubiquitous because of 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See generally Roderick L. Ireland, The Roxbury Defenders Committee: Reflections on the Early 
Years, 95 MASS. L. REV. 153 (2013). 
 4 Radha Natarajan, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to Cross-Racial 
Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1821–23 (2003). 
 5 See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 313 (Mass. 2009) (reversing the de-
fendant’s murder conviction based on prejudicial errors made by the prosecutor in closing argument), 
abrogated in part by Commonwealth v. Moore, 109 N.E.3d 484 (Mass. 2018) (refining Silva-
Santiago’s articulation of standard for admitting evidence regarding adequacy of police investigation). 
 6 Bobby Joe Leaster’s case was significant for us both. See Bobby Joe Leaster, NAT’L REGISTRY 
OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetailpre1989.aspx
?caseid=188 [https://perma.cc/JKY6-TY8Z] (describing the exoneration of Bobby Joe Leaster after he 
was misidentified through a show-up identification). 
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the nature of human memory and the existence of available remedies—or at 
least harm-reduction strategies—made this issue an obvious one on which to 
focus. Despite its various complex implications—police protocols, admissibil-
ity of eyewitness evidence, and jury instructions—Chief Justice Gants never 
failed to see and directly confront the breadth of the issue. As a result, his vi-
sion to steer in a new direction the very large ship of Massachusetts eyewitness 
law, anchored down by decades of precedent, was successful, even if uninten-
tionally incomplete. I am grateful beyond words that I walked many steps with 
him toward that vision. 
B. The Right Time and Place 
(by Erik Doughty) 
In the summer of 2014, at one of our first meetings, my co-clerk Chris 
and I struggled with how to address Chief Justice Gants, a consequence of our 
greenness and his new title. My first attempt at a question went something like, 
“Um, Mr. Chief Gants Justice . . . .” For our benefit more than his own, he said 
that we could call him “Chief” or “Judge,” and he had no preference between 
the two. He only asked that we not call him “Justice.” It sounded much too 
formal and lofty, and he would always think of himself as a Judge from his 
years on the Superior Court. It was the first of countless moments during the 
clerkship when he lifted our spirits and quieted our fears with humor and hu-
mility. 
When the Chief assigned my first case—a challenge to the existing model 
jury instruction on eyewitness identification evidence—I was quietly dis-
tressed. I had graduated from law school only a few months earlier, and I knew 
nothing about eyewitness identification, evidence, or jury instructions. I soon 
discovered, however, that one of Chief Justice Gants’s many superpowers was 
his ability to empower the people around him. Without deadlines or reserva-
tions, he allowed me to fully immerse myself in the science and law of eyewit-
ness identification (and to rack up a dizzying number of interlibrary loan re-
quests for social science journals in the process). His door was always open to 
talk through ideas. I can picture him now, leaning back in his chair and extend-
ing his arms with outstretched fingers as if physically wrestling with the issue 
presented. Then he would lean in, listening intently to my muddled question, 
his nose twitching with inquisitive energy. Just when I think I have lost him, as 
I had surely lost myself long ago, he would casually offer a single suggestion 
(usually in just a few words) that unscrambled the static. 
Whereas Radha and Chief Justice Gants found each other through crimi-
nal justice reform, I found criminal justice reform through Chief Justice Gants. 
During the clerkship, he wrote five decisions on issues of eyewitness identifi-
cation. Those decisions built upon the foundation that he had laid years earlier 
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for reexamining the law in light of the science of memory and perception. By 
incorporating science into the law, the Chief overhauled the model jury instruc-
tions and rules of evidence to be more balanced, helpful to juries, and protec-
tive against the risk of wrongful convictions. Chief Justice Gants believed the 
work of the Court was not only to analyze legal issues, but to solve problems 
in the legal system that impacted people. And if you cared about this work and 
were ready to do the work, even someone like me with so little experience or 
knowledge could join him. I have had no greater privilege or honor than a spot 
on the Chief’s team as he reformed the law of eyewitness identification. 
II. A NEW APPROACH: THE STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS  
EVIDENCE (2011–2013) 
(by Radha Natarajan) 
The approach Chief Justice Gants took to reconsidering how Massachu-
setts courts should treat eyewitness identification evidence was neither ordi-
nary nor inevitable. There are other courts that have considered the causes of 
wrongful conviction and injustice within the criminal legal system, but the 
process spearheaded by Chief Justice Gants was uncommon if not unique. 
When he convened the Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence (Study Group) 
ten years ago, a few states had already made changes to eyewitness practice 
and procedure, the most notable of which was New Jersey.7 New Jersey’s 
changes were accomplished primarily through court hearings and court cases. 
Chief Justice Gants could easily have taken this route as well, since this was 
the forum already available to him and opportunities had already presented 
themselves with two important cases, Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago and 
Commonwealth v. Walker.8 
In Silva-Santiago, the Court reversed a murder conviction because of 
prosecutorial errors made during closing argument.9 Although the appellant 
had not preserved that issue, he had specifically asked the Court to consider 
various arguments related to the identification evidence.10 The Court was 
asked to exclude eyewitness evidence as a consequence of the police not fol-
lowing best practices when administering identification procedures. In that 
case, the officers used non-blind, unrecorded, simultaneous photo arrays with-
out providing the eyewitnesses with any advisements about the procedure. Alt-
hough he acknowledged the importance of best practices, Chief Justice Gants, 
writing for the Court, did not reverse the conviction because of those flaws in 
the identification procedures. Instead, the Court discussed the issues, indicat-
                                                                                                                           
 7 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918–19 (N.J. 2011). 
 8 Commonwealth v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195 (Mass. 2011); Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d at 299. 
 9 906 N.E.2d at 320. 
 10 Id. at 309–11. 
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ing that it “expect[ed] such protocols to be used in the future,”11 but offered no 
relief to Mr. Silva-Santiago on that basis. This lackluster response was charac-
teristic of how courts had often treated eyewitness evidence, including evi-
dence that could have led to a wrongful conviction. Indeed, on retrial, Mr. Sil-
va-Santiago was acquitted and is now listed with others wrongfully convicted 
in the National Registry of Exonerations.12 In Walker, the Court declined to 
reverse the appellant’s murder conviction.13 Still, Chief Justice Gants, writing 
for the Court, did discuss in some detail the eyewitness identification argu-
ments raised by the case.14 There, the evidence was challenged on appeal be-
cause the appellant was identified through a simultaneous all-suspect array in 
which no advisements were given to the eyewitness. In addition, the appellant 
challenged the reliability of the identification, apart from any suggestiveness in 
the procedure. Although the Court declined to provide relief to Mr. Walker, 
Chief Justice Gants used the arguments raised in this case to announce the cre-
ation of the Study Group: 
Because eyewitness identification is the greatest source of wrongful 
convictions but also an invaluable law enforcement tool in obtaining 
accurate convictions, and because the research regarding eyewitness 
identification procedures is complex and evolving, we shall convene 
a study committee to consider how we can best deter unnecessarily 
suggestive procedures and whether existing model jury instructions 
provide adequate guidance to juries in evaluating eyewitness testi-
mony.15 
With these two cases as backdrops, Chief Justice Gants could have issued 
decisions that would have changed the Commonwealth’s approach to eyewit-
ness identification evidence in significant respects. So, why create a Study 
Group instead? Having participated in the Study Group, and with an under-
standing of what other states had done, I had the opportunity (much later) to 
ask Chief Justice Gants that question: Why did he choose to create a Study 
Group instead of simply adopting what had been done in other states? After all, 
the science that provided the foundation for those changes elsewhere did not 
differ by jurisdiction. Indeed, as the global pandemic has illustrated with ex-
cruciating clarity, neither borders nor denial could change the reality of sci-
ence. 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Id. at 312. 
 12 Jesus Silva-Santiago, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4285 [https://perma.cc/U6TG-G8JM]. 
 13 953 N.E.2d at 199–200. 
 14 Id. at 204–12. 
 15 Id. at 208 n.16. 
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Chief Justice Gants’s response to me was—unsurprisingly—both insight-
ful and masterfully strategic. He recognized that creating transformational 
change—which is what it would take to reduce wrongful convictions based on 
misidentification evidence—would require more than one or two court deci-
sions. It would require a sea change, at least in the criminal law, in how we 
think about the intersection of the law and science. It would require rigorous 
study. It would require many different people to come together, outside the 
confines of a single case, to think broadly and comprehensively toward a 
common vision. To make real change, it required a movement urged by many 
people, not only a decision by the highest court. 
There are not too many examples of this kind of democratization within 
the judicial system, where an appointed judge (especially an indisputably bril-
liant one) seeks the input and perspective of so many others in the develop-
ment of the law. Chief Justice Gants, however, was well known for bringing 
people in, not shutting them out. He enjoyed amicus briefs and welcomed ex-
pertise outside the parties. He believed in building consensus both on the court 
and in this work. When it came to eyewitness identifications, he both recog-
nized the need for this approach and the value of individuals in various—often 
adversarial—positions being asked to work toward a collective decision. The 
Study Group members took this role incredibly seriously and ultimately met 
even Chief Justice Gants’s high expectations. 
The Study Group’s composition, process, and commitment were im-
portant to carrying out Chief Justice Gants’s vision, which did not foretell the 
ultimate recommendations the group should make but required a thorough, 
intellectually honest process. As in all groups, composition was critical to the 
success of the endeavor. In this case, it required wide representation, including 
from judges in various courts who hear eyewitness identification cases, de-
fense attorneys and prosecutors who defend against and rely on eyewitness 
evidence, police officers who administer identification procedures, and aca-
demics who have stepped back to understand the issue from a different vantage 
point. The most important part of the process was the first step, which focused 
on collective education. Each member of the Study Group had to delve deeply 
into the science—something that was not intuitive for most people in the 
law—in order to build a common foundation of understanding. That common 
foundation consisted of the principles for which there was significant agree-
ment within the scientific community. The consensus recommendations of the 
Study Group, which encompassed more areas than its original mandate of de-
veloping jury instructions, were based on the expertise of its members as well 
as a fidelity to the science. The Study Group was an entirely voluntary enter-
prise by its members over a two-year period, requiring dedication to the ulti-
mate goal of improving the way Massachusetts handles eyewitness evidence. 
The commitment of the Study Group was essential to the final product—a 175-
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page report to the Justices (the Report) detailing the science and recommenda-
tions for significant change.16 
Study committees of the legislative variety are often seen as a graveyard 
for ideas that are too edgy or do not gain traction for other reasons. Chief Jus-
tice Gants did not believe in graveyards for ideas, especially the edgy ones, 
and he did not intend for the Report to end up on a shelf to be ignored. Instead, 
he first sought even more perspectives by soliciting public comments on the 
Report. This generated tremendous feedback from the Bench and Bar, with 
several expressing the view that the recommendations were too radical. This 
was because those outside the Study Group had not gone through the collective 
education process that had led to recommendations based on science rather 
than precedent. The Study Group, after all, was not tied to the status quo, an 
incremental view of change, or precedent; its only loyalties were to scientific 
evidence and increasing justice. After the Study Group, bar associations, public 
defenders, prosecutors, police departments, judges, and the public all had a 
chance to weigh in on the question of how Massachusetts would treat eyewit-
ness identification evidence, it was the Supreme Judicial Court’s turn, with 
Chief Justice Gants at its center. Although the Court may have had a tepid re-
sponse to this issue prior to the Report, it was evident that the Report’s issu-
ance and reactions thereto created the impetus for dramatic changes. 
III. FOLLOWING THE SCIENCE TO CHANGE THE LAW (2014–2015) 
(by Erik Doughty) 
One year after the Report was published, on July 28, 2014, Chief Justice 
Gants was sworn in as the Chief Justice, and it did not take long for a case to 
squarely raise the issues addressed in the Report. On September 2, 2014, the 
first day of oral arguments, the Court heard four cases concerning eyewitness 
identification evidence. In the first of many post-argument huddles, the Chief 
told my co-clerk and me that he typically would have two opinions to write in 
a given month. Needless to say, the Chief informed us (with some sympathy) 
that he would write all four eyewitness identification cases. Three of those cas-
es ultimately became precedent-setting decisions and monumental steps to-
ward overhauling Massachusetts’s treatment of eyewitness identification evi-
dence. 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See generally SUPREME JUD. CT. STUDY GRP. ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS TO THE JUSTICES (2013), https://www.mass.gov/doc/supreme-judicial-court-study-
group-on-eyewitness-evidence-report-and-recommendations-to-the/download [https://perma.cc/CVJ7-
QNJK]. 
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A. A Radical Shift in Courtroom Procedure for In-Court  
Eyewitness Identifications 
Two of the cases heard that opening day in September, Commonwealth v. 
Crayton and Commonwealth v. Collins, asked the Court to reexamine the ad-
missibility of in-court identifications.17 An in-court identification typically oc-
curs in the courtroom when the prosecutor asks an eyewitness to identify for 
the jury the defendant sitting at counsel’s table. It is powerful evidence and 
often an iconic moment during trial. Indeed, many would consider in-court 
identifications to be trial procedure canon and their acceptance self-
explanatory. As Chief Justice Gants recognized, however, in-court identifica-
tions are inherently suggestive: 
[W]here the prosecutor asks the eyewitness if the person who com-
mitted the crime is in the courtroom, the eyewitness knows that the 
defendant has been charged and is being tried for that crime. The 
presence of the defendant in the courtroom is likely to be understood 
by the eyewitness as confirmation that the prosecutor, as a result of 
the criminal investigation, believes that the defendant is the person 
whom the eyewitness saw commit the crime.18 
They are comparable to out-of-court “showup identifications”—where a 
police officer presents a single individual to an eyewitness for identification 
rather than as part of a lineup—which were long considered suggestive and 
“generally disfavored.”19 
Relying on the Report, Crayton declared a new rule that would treat first-
time in-court identifications (i.e., where the eyewitness had not previously 
identified the defendant in an out-of-court procedure) as “in-court showup[s]” 
and would admit them only where there was “good reason” to do so.20 This 
new rule was crucial to closing a loophole for the admission of first-time in-
court identifications. Previously, Massachusetts had a rule of per se exclusion 
of unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court identifications, but an in-court identi-
fication was excluded only where it was tainted by an impermissibly sugges-
tive out-of-court identification.21 Where there was no prior out-of-court identi-
fication, there was no clear basis for challenging it. Although first-time “in-
court identifications may be more suggestive than showups,” they were admit-
ted as a matter of course prior to Crayton.22 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 161 (Mass. 2014); Commonwealth v. Collins, 21 
N.E.3d 528, 530 (Mass. 2014). 
 18 Crayton, 21 N.E.3d at 166. 
 19 Id. at 165–66 (quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 560 (Mass. 2006)). 
 20 Id. at 168–69. 
 21 See id. 
 22 Id. at 166–67. 
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Crayton not only closed the loophole for the unchecked admission of 
first-time in-court identifications, it also reallocated the burden to present or 
suppress this type of evidence. (Chief Justice Gants had a sixth sense for hom-
ing in on subtle imbalances and impracticalities at the periphery of a case). The 
defendant generally had the burden to move to suppress, but the Chief dis-
cerned that this made little sense if only the prosecutor knew whether a first-
time in-court identification would be elicited. Crayton shifted the burden to the 
prosecutor to move in limine to admit the identification.23 
In the companion case, Collins, the Crayton rule requiring “good reason” 
for admission was extended from first-time in-court identifications to in-court 
identifications following an out-of-court identification where a witness had 
“made something less than an unequivocal positive identification of the de-
fendant during a nonsuggestive identification procedure.”24 An in-court identi-
fication following a less-than-unequivocal positive identification posed a 
slightly different danger in that the jury might overlook “or minimize the earli-
er failure to make a positive identification” and thus “give undue weight to the 
unnecessarily suggestive in-court identification.”25 Relying on the Report, the 
Chief broke with past precedent that simply left it to defense counsel on cross-
examination to diminish the weight of the in-court identification.26 Judges in 
other states have since followed the path set forth in Crayton and Collins for 
subjecting in-court identifications to a higher level of scrutiny.27 
B. Overhauling the Model Jury Instruction on Eyewitness Identification 
The third major case from the September session was Commonwealth v. 
Gomes.28 The issue presented was whether a trial judge should have granted a 
request for an eyewitness identification jury instruction based on a recently 
adopted model instruction in New Jersey.29 Unlike the traditional Massachu-
                                                                                                                           
 23 See id. at 170–71. 
 24 Commonwealth v. Collins, 21 N.E.3d 528, 534, 536 (Mass. 2014). 
 25 Id. at 534. 
 26 Id. at 536. (“[C]ross-examination cannot always be expected to reveal an inaccurate in-court 
identification where ‘most jurors are unaware of the weak correlation between confidence and accura-
cy and of witness susceptibility to ‘manipulation by suggestive procedures or confirming feedback.’” 
(quoting SUPREME JUD. CT. STUDY GRP. ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 16, at 20) (citation 
omitted)). 
 27 See, e.g., Garner v. People, 436 P.3d 1107, 1122 (Colo. 2019) (Hart, J., dissenting) (citing Cray-
ton and Collins in concluding that the “characteristics of an in-court identification—its suggestive-
ness, fallibility, persuasiveness, and imperviousness to cross-examination—make first-time in-court 
identifications exactly the kind of identification procedure that is ‘conduc[ive] to irreparable mistaken 
identification’” (alteration in original) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972))); State v. 
Dickson, 141 A.3d 810, 835 (Conn. 2016) (citing Crayton and Collins to provide guidance for first-
time identifications). 
 28 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015). 
 29 Id. at 902. 
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setts instruction, New Jersey’s new model discussed settled principles of eye-
witness identification and human memory that had emerged over decades of 
research.30 Massachusetts’s model (known as the Rodriguez instruction) was 
adopted nearly forty years before Gomes, and several federal and state courts 
used comparable models.31 The Rodriguez instruction provided a general list of 
factors for the jury to consider, for example, the opportunity the witness had to 
observe the person committing the crime, the length of time between the crime 
and the identification, and the circumstances surrounding any identification 
procedure.32 It provided, however, little to no instruction as to how those fac-
tors affect the accuracy of an identification. Nor did it address the many scien-
tific principles that forty years of research had shown can impact the reliability 
of an identification, or may otherwise conflict with a common sense under-
standing of how memory and perception work. 
Gomes could have been a summary order of no precedential significance. 
On the only issue squarely before the Court—whether the judge abused his 
discretion in denying the request for New Jersey’s instruction—the Court af-
firmed.33 Given the Chief’s years of leadership on issues of eyewitness identi-
fication, though, it was perhaps unsurprising when he evoked Walker and the 
Report and pronounced, “[I]t is now time to do what we declared we were 
willing to do with respect to eyewitness identification jury instructions.”34 
Indeed, Gomes overhauled the Massachusetts model instruction to incor-
porate principles and factors that had gained acceptance in the scientific com-
munity.35 But just as important as the new instruction itself was how Chief Jus-
tice Gants implemented these changes. He did not write Gomes as the final 
word on eyewitness identification jury instructions, but as the next chapter. For 
instance, when the Court adopted the Rodriguez instruction, the instruction 
was appended to the Rodriguez opinion and declared the model instruction in a 
footnote.36 The Chief could have done the same, but he chose a different path. 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Id. at 903. 
 31 Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889, 879–98 (Mass. 1979); see, e.g., United States v. 
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972); PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEV-
ENTH CIRCUIT § 3.12 (2012 ed.), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-instructions/7th_criminal_
jury_instr.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDY9-CFMP]; MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 4.11 (2010 ed.), https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/
jury-instructions/node/487 [https://perma.cc/C8AN-K4UR]; VT. BAR ASS’N, VERMONT MODEL 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CR05-601 (2003), http://www.vtjuryinstructions.org/criminal/MS05-
601.htm [https://perma.cc/9LMM-DTEG]; WV CRIM. L. RSCH. CTR., WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 5.05 (6th ed. 2003), http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/wvajury.pdf [https://perma.
cc/HZ6Z-CEY4]. 
 32 Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 906. 
 33 Id. at 904–05. 
 34 Id. at 905. 
 35 Id. at 910–17. 
 36 See Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d at 893, 897–98, 897 n.1. 
2021] Reflections: Chief Justice Gants’s Legacy in Eyewitness Identification Law 2735 
The instruction appended to Gomes was characterized as “provisional” and the 
Court “invite[d] [public] comments regarding its content and clarity.”37 The 
call for public comments was not an empty gesture either. The Chief carefully 
read each of the numerous submissions from the public when he later led the 
effort to transform the provisional instruction into the model. 
Chief Justice Gants also appreciated the importance of not only improv-
ing the model jury instruction but of providing a framework through which the 
model could evolve with the research and science.38 Gomes clarified the legal 
standard—”a near consensus in the relevant scientific community”—for de-
termining whether a scientific principle of eyewitness identification was ap-
propriate for inclusion in a jury instruction.39 The Study Group and others rec-
ommended the Court take judicial notice of the scientific principles of human 
memory and perception. But Chief Justice Gants foresaw that judicially no-
ticeable facts may be disregarded by the jury, and applying judicial notice to 
craft a jury instruction may limit the instruction’s impact. The “near consen-
sus” standard ensured that the established principles set forth in the jury in-
struction were treated like instructions of law, while also providing a basis for 
parties to challenge, supplement, and modify the model instruction in light of 
scientific developments or expert testimony. 
Only a few months after the release of Gomes, the Court itself modified 
the provisional instruction as it related to cross-racial eyewitness identification. 
In Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, Chief Justice Gants explored the social science 
supporting the existence of the cross-race effect, “that people are generally less 
accurate at identifying members of other races than they are at identifying 
members of their own race.”40 Although the existence of the cross-race effect 
was clear, the definition of race in this context was not. After careful review of 
the science, and guided by the Chief’s sensitivity to the complications involved 
with judges ruling on the race of people involved in an identification, the Court 
directed that a cross-racial instruction shall be given in all cases where the 
model eyewitness identification instruction applies, unless both sides agree to 
waive it.41 Thus, Chief Justice Gants adopted an elegant, simple solution to 
avoid a procedure with limitless complexities. 
He also anticipated that the Court would need help keeping pace with the 
science. Along with the release of the Gomes opinion, Chief Justice Gants 
formed the Standing Committee on Eyewitness Identification (the Standing 
Committee) to apprise the Court of developments in the law and science of 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 900–01, 916–17. 
 38 See id. at 911 (“[W]e acknowledge the possibility that, as the science evolves, we may need to 
revise our new model instruction’s description of a principle.” (footnote omitted)). 
 39 See id. at 909. 
 40 32 N.E.3d 873, 880 (Mass. 2015). 
 41 Id. at 883. 
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eyewitness identification and to recommend revisions to the model instruction 
as necessary.42 Like the Study Group that preceded it, the Standing Committee 
was composed of a diverse spectrum of stakeholders and interested parties: 
trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law school professors, and law en-
forcement officers. The Standing Committee engaged in thoughtful debate and 
discussion about how to improve the provisional instruction, to make it simpler 
to understand, scientifically accurate, and balanced. After months of collabora-
tion, the Standing Committee reached agreement on a proposed revised in-
struction. Chief Justice Gants, who led the Court’s effort to prepare a model 
instruction after Gomes, afforded significant weight to the work of the Stand-
ing Committee. He deeply valued the perspective of a diverse group of people 
working together to reach a consensus. 
In November 2015, four years after the Chief first convened the Study 
Group, the Court issued the official model jury instruction on eyewitness iden-
tification.43 The model’s language was streamlined and more plainly worded 
compared to the provisional instruction. It added a preliminary or contempora-
neous instruction on eyewitness identification evidence to be given early in the 
trial so that the jury could be attuned to the issues of eyewitness identification 
from the outset of the case.44 The model also benefited from the Standing 
Committee’s proposal and public comments from other trial judges, defense 
attorneys, practitioners, bar association and professional groups, and nonprofit 
organizations.45 Chief Justice Gants understood that the model instruction 
alone would not create the sea change needed to solve the myriad challenges in 
evaluating eyewitness identification evidence.46 But what the Chief accom-
plished in overhauling the model instruction cannot be fully appreciated by 
looking only at the new instruction’s text. The model instruction was also im-
portant for its downstream impact on other aspects of the criminal legal sys-
tem. It changed the baseline understanding of the science and the law of eye-
witness identification for trial judges, law enforcement officers, and the bar, 
providing a path toward more careful administration of identification proce-
dures, more effective cross-examination and challenges to the evidence, and 
more informed rulings from the bench. After Gomes, though the work was not 
nearly done, there was also no turning back. 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 911 n.25. 
 43 See generally MASS. SUPREME JUD. CT., STATEMENT, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EYE-
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2015), https://www.mass.gov/doc/model-jury-instructions-on-eyewitness-
identification-november-16-2015/download [https://perma.cc/K8T9-R6WX] [hereinafter MASS MOD-
EL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION]. 
 44 Id. at 1–2. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 917 (describing the new model instruction as “at least one source of 
reliable information in cases where expert testimony is not offered”). 
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IV. THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE GANTS’S SCIENCE-BASED APPROACH 
A. Beyond the First Term 
In his first term leading the Supreme Judicial Court, Chief Justice Gants 
had already made an impact on in-court identifications and eyewitness identi-
fication jury instructions. Both were accomplished through the vehicle of court 
decisions, but not in a vacuum. They had the important foundation of the Study 
Group’s research and recommendations as well as the support of others who 
had weighed in through comments. Neither change was minor, nor were they 
isolated. The significant lesson from these cases—that the law on eyewitness 
identification should be informed by scientific research—is one that permeated 
beyond Chief Justice Gants’s first term as Chief and one that will likely be an 
enduring part of his legacy. 
In his second term, Chief Justice Gants authored Commonwealth v. John-
son, yet another foundational decision in the Massachusetts eyewitness identi-
fication canon.47 Although Crayton, Collins, and Gomes/Bastaldo addressed 
issues that occur during trial, Johnson focused on the reliability of out-of-court 
identifications that typically occur in the investigative phase of a criminal 
case.48 As background, there are at least two ways that a person accused of a 
crime in Massachusetts can argue that, though they have been identified by a 
witness, the identification should not be used against them. Under the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights, if an identification was so unnecessarily sug-
gestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification that it deprives someone 
of due process, then it must be excluded.49 Importantly, this constitutional 
standard requires that the suggestiveness was caused by a state actor as the law 
typically excludes evidence in order to deter official misconduct.50 
Identification evidence, however, can also be excluded in Massachusetts 
based on “[c]ommon law principles of fairness,” as is detailed in Common-
wealth v. Jones.51 This avenue recognizes that where suggestiveness may have 
contaminated an identification, the source of that suggestiveness (state action 
or not) should not determine whether it can be used against someone who faces 
a loss of their freedom. Although this ground had been available to people ac-
cused of crimes since 1996, it was not well known and it was seldom used. 
The Johnson case provided an opportunity both to reaffirm and redefine 
when identification evidence violates common law principles of fairness. This 
was necessary because the Jones case was not widely appreciated and was de-
                                                                                                                           
 47 45 N.E.3d 83 (Mass. 2016). 
 48 Id. at 86. 
 49 Id. at 88. 
 50 Id. 
 51 666 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (Mass. 1996) (introducing criteria for excluding identification evidence 
based on common law principles of fairness). 
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cided without the benefit of the scientific research that bears on it. In the John-
son case, the victim walked in on a stranger in his apartment. The victim con-
fronted the man and the two briefly tussled. The stranger then ran out of the 
apartment. Based on the brief interaction, the victim could only describe the 
man as a light-skinned Black man wearing a gray, hooded sweatshirt. Before 
participating in any identification procedure with the police, the victim’s 
cousin showed the victim a photo of a man the cousin thought could be the 
intruder. In addition to sharing the photo of only one person, the cousin had 
informed the victim that the man in the photo looked like the man who had 
broken into his own apartment merely a day before the victim’s apartment was 
entered. Based on this one photo and suggestive information, the victim told 
the police that he could identify the intruder as Mr. Johnson.52 Although there 
was no state action that had led to this identification, the suggestiveness inher-
ent in this “procedure” still needed to be scrutinized. 
Chief Justice Gants, writing for the Court, clarified through the lens of 
scientific research how trial courts should adjudicate claims that an identifica-
tion violated common law principles of fairness. Specifically, the court must 
weigh the danger of unfair prejudice (how any suggestiveness that inflated the 
witness’s confidence or altered a witness’s perception of their memory might 
make it more difficult for a jury to assess accuracy) against the probative value 
of the identification (by considering the strength of the witness’s memory). If 
the suggestiveness that led to the identification, considered in the context of 
the scientific factors that affect memory accuracy, render the identification un-
reliable, it cannot be used against the person accused.53 
The Johnson decision has had a particularly significant impact in recent 
years because even as Massachusetts law enforcement has made strides to re-
duce suggestiveness in identification procedures, individuals have taken it up-
on themselves to investigate cases through social media or other suggestive 
processes. Given the proliferation of technology, the Johnson decision has en-
abled litigants and judges to consider all identifications, not only those admin-
istered by law enforcement. In other words, Johnson provides a powerful tool 
to prevent wrongful convictions. 
Beyond this decision, Chief Justice Gants continued to leverage scientific 
research to understand and decide eyewitness cases that came before the court. 
In Commonwealth v. Thomas, Chief Justice Gants delved into the novel issue 
of the suggestive identification of an inanimate object by affirming the motion 
judge’s exclusion of the identification of a gun.54 Specifically, Chief Justice 
Gants found the identification of the gun was unreliable where the witness had 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Johnson, 45 N.E.3d at 86–88. 
 53 Id. at 90–92. 
 54 68 N.E.3d 1161, 1173 (Mass. 2017). 
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a limited view of the gun used during the crime, the initial description of the 
gun was vague, she was shown one photograph of the gun seized and only af-
terwards, provided further detail on the gun’s appearance, and her confidence 
was inflated by the detectives’ “confirmatory statements.”55 Not only did Chief 
Justice Gants apply scientific principles of perception and memory, and the 
malleability of memory, to this context, he urged police departments to devel-
op protocols to reduce suggestiveness where a witness needs to identify an in-
animate object.56 He never wasted an opportunity to make recommendations 
even if they were not in the form of a court order. 
Finally, even when he was not writing for the Court, Chief Justice Gants 
was a persistent proponent of science in this area of the law. In Commonwealth 
v. Dew, the Court confronted the standard for admitting an in-court identifica-
tion that was preceded by an unequivocally positive (but inherently suggestive) 
showup.57 Although the Court’s majority considered this case to be an applica-
tion of Collins, Chief Justice Gants recognized that the danger of an in-court 
identification following a suggestive out-of-court procedure was distinct. He 
wrote a vital concurrence, relying on the Report and other scientific sources to 
identify the danger, which was less severe than the Collins situation, but “still 
substantial.”58 “Allowing an in-court identification in addition to a showup 
identification creates a risk that the jury will gloss over these particular aspects 
of the showup identification and simply accept the subsequent in-court identi-
fication.”59 Chief Justice Gants also challenged the majority’s Johnson balanc-
ing analysis, which attributed significant probative value to an in-court identi-
fication merely because it “corroborate[d] other evidence”: 
By this standard, a Ouija board has probative value if it points to the 
guilt of a defendant because it corroborates the other compelling ev-
idence of his guilt. The probative value of evidence must be evaluat-
ed on whether it fairly adds to the weight of the other evidence, not 
simply on whether it is consistent with that evidence.60 
The Chief’s concurrence provided valuable guidance for grappling with 
the risks posed by an in-court identification following a suggestive out-of-
court procedure, which cannot be discerned from Crayton, Collins, or the ma-
jority opinion in Dew. Although he preferred consensus, Chief Justice Gants 
never shied away from honest disagreement, especially when it came to an 
issue about which he cared so deeply. 
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 56 Id. at 1175. 
 57 85 N.E.3d 22, 33 (Mass. 2017) (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
 58 Id. at 36. 
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B. Beyond Eyewitness Identification 
Chief Justice Gants was proud that Massachusetts became a leader in its 
approach to eyewitness identification evidence. He was particularly proud of 
the process it took to get there: bringing many people together in intense study 
and being faithful to the science. Indeed, he wrote a law review article about it 
(at a time when his schedule was impossibly packed) so that judges and attor-
neys in other jurisdictions could learn from the progress made in Massachu-
setts.61 He believed in that process so much that he made an effort to replicate 
it with other issues beyond eyewitness identification. 
Returning to the Standing Committee, Chief Justice Gants tasked its 
members with researching “near consensus” scientific principles on three areas 
and incorporating that research within accessible, proposed model jury instruc-
tions. The three areas he identified for study included general memory of wit-
nesses, beyond the specific context of eyewitness identification; credibility of 
witnesses; and implicit bias. Each of these areas are relevant in nearly all trials, 
but the model jury instructions on each issue (like the one used before Gomes 
for eyewitness identification) had been constructed without adherence to scien-
tific principles.62 
Chief Justice Gants depended on research in other ways as well. Appreci-
ating the significant racial disparities in sentencing in the Commonwealth, he 
sought the assistance of a research team at the Criminal Justice Policy Program 
at Harvard Law School to dissect the available data and report their findings to 
the Court. He was unafraid to confront evidence even where the evidence re-
vealed ugly truths. He was interested in being held personally accountable and 
wanted the Court and other institutions to be held accountable as well. He 
knew that such accountability was necessary for change and that denial and 
complacency would yield no progress. He consistently applied these principles 
and values, in the context of eyewitness misidentifications and in many other 
areas that threatened justice. 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Ralph D. Gants & Erik N. Doughty, Where Science Conflicts with Common Sense: Eyewit-
ness Identification Reform in Massachusetts, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1617 (2015–2016). 
 62 As of this writing, the Standing Committee has drafted proposed language, congruent with 
scientific research, on each of these areas and has presented those to the Supreme Judicial Court. On 
September 29, 2021, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the recommendation of the Standing Com-
mittee and issued a Model Jury Instruction on Implicit Bias. Supreme Judicial Court Model Jury In-
structions on Implicit Bias, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/supreme-judicial-court-
model-jury-instructions-on-implicit-bias [https://perma.cc/LXS2-BFKG]. While announcing the new 
model instruction, Chief Justice Budd acknowledged the work of the Standing Committee and specifi-
cally asked it to “continue to review the applicable research, and recommend revisions as needed or 
warranted.” Id. (emphasis added). In this way, though under different leadership, the Supreme Judicial 
Court has signaled its intent to continue making our jury instructions, and thus our law, more respon-
sive to scientific developments. Although Chief Justice Gants cannot be here to see the fruits of this 
labor, it was his initiative that made it possible. 
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CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice Gants brought so many people together, including the two 
of us, to be co-conspirators with him on a long journey toward more justice. 
The efforts he made toward reducing wrongful convictions based on eyewit-
ness misidentifications was nothing short of revolutionary. We never expected 
to lose him so soon, though perhaps any moment would have been too soon for 
someone so courageous and kind. One of his greatest accomplishments as a 
leader, however, was empowering others to harness their intellect and passion 
toward change. We know that his lessons, those he embedded in his decisions 
and those he shared with others, will not be lost. We carry his work forward to 
honor our commitments to our communities and to his memory. 
